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Troublemaker or Whistleblower? How
One Man Took On the Soviet Mafia
“Truth-seeking” can become a real illness. People start writing and they can’t
stop – this becomes a life purpose, and turns into scandal-mongering or
graphomania. Some of these people need a medical cure. Isn’t it crazy to appeal
to Soviet laws all the time and expect them to be observed?
A roundtable discussant, imagined by Lampert (1985: p. 183).
Men that live in retirement under the care of their wives and daughters are often in
need of occupation. This was certainly true of Mr Nikolaenko, who lived with his
wife, elder daughter Valentina, and their other children near Denau where vines and
cotton grow in the sunlit valley of the Surkhan Daria River, not far from the Afghan
border to the south of Uzbekistan. To fill the time on his hands, he wrote letters to
the newspapers.
This was a time of great change in the public life of the Soviet Union. In 1953 an
era ended with Stalin’s death. There was a period of limited openness and honesty,
known as the Thaw. After a brief struggle Nikita Khrushchev picked up the reins of
power as Soviet leader; rejecting Stalin and forsaking mass terror, he began to
pursue policies that might be called “Stalinism with a human face.” Within strict
limits, Soviet citizens began to engage with the chief problem that Khrushchev
raised: the abuse of personal authority in a secretive, centralized one-party state.
Making Trouble
Mr Nikolaenko was a civil war veteran and pensioner.
1 In the record he is described
as having a disability of the “second group”; this official classification implies
something serious, arising possibly from war wounds. His pension was most likely
compensation for his disability since most Soviet rural inhabitants did not have
access to an age-related retirement pension at this time. Despite this, he evidently
had reasonable underlying health. He had worked as carter and storekeeper of the
Communism collective farm until 1951. In retirement, he kept an allotment and
went hunting and fishing to supplement his family income. His daughter Valentina
also worked on the Communism farm and subsequently on the bigger farm, named
after Khrushchev, created through a local merger.
1 The story is from the Hoover Archive, Documents from the Russian State
Archive of Recent History (RGANI), Fond 6, Opis 6, Delo 1706, folios 6 to 16
(Instructor Fedorenko of the Committee of Party Control of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, report “On the results of verification of
the complaint of Nikolaenko M.A. about the facts of incorrect attitude to criticism of
faults in the Surkhan Darya district of Uzbekistan,” dated August 19, 1959) and 17
(Committee of Party Control member Dzhurabaev, memo to the Committee of Party
Control dated October 22, 1959).2
In pensioner Nikolaenko’s view, the farm was mismanaged. With a wife and
daughter to make his home and run after him, he may have had time to brood and
not much else to think about. In due course, time to brood became time to act. One
avenue open to him was to write to the press.
In the conditions of the Thaw, public opinion was being voiced openly again.
Newspapers received far more letters than could be published. The number of
letters reaching Izvestiia, the government newspaper in Moscow, for example,
exploded from 37,301 in 1952 and 46,974 in 1955 to 211,000 in 1960 (Lampert
1985, p. 64). Of the letters circulating in the Denau region, many were probably from
Mr Nikolaenko. Three of them scored direct hits.
His first letter to be accepted for publication appeared in The Uzbek republican
paper Pravda Vostoka (Truth of the East) in March 1954, and was followed by a
second in March 1956.Letter no. 1 complained about abuses by local work brigade
leader Muminov. Letter no. 2 aimed higher. It alleged that Khrushchev farm
chairman Keldyev had fired the farm’s agricultural technician (agronomist). It
complained of abuses committed by deputy farm chairman, Alikulov. In passing, it
raised suspicions about Alikulov’s social origins, claiming the latter was a child of
wealthy individual peasant farmers (“kulaks”) deported on Stalin’s orders in the
1930s when the collective farms were created. And it took aim at secretary
Khaidarov of the Denau regional party committee, who had adopted an “incorrect
attitude to the question of the elimination of defects” – in other words, most likely,
Nikolaenko had written to Khaidarov about these issues and Khaidarov had ignored
him or told him to get lost.
2
As for letter no. 3, published in the Surkhan-Daria district paper Leninskoe
znamia (Lenin’s Banner) in early 1958, it complained about the poor postal service
(“No, Mr Nikolaenko, I’m certain we never received your letter”), abuses on the pig
farm, insanitary maintenance of the vegetable plot, and so on.
During this time Mr Nikolaenko became increasingly angry. He was already cross
about things that he could see people doing (or not doing), and he was cross with
the people doing (or not doing) these things. We will see that a lot of his points were
well made. He wanted to let the world know – at least, the world of the Surkhan
Daria. He had plenty of persistence, and he needed this because he faced many
obstacles, usually put in his place by the people he was complaining about or their
friends. Every time he hit one of those obstacles it fuelled his anger and
determination and it added another target for his complaints. Finally, as a pensioner
he had time and not much else to do. Or maybe his wife or daughter would have
liked him to do something else and stay quiet, but he didn’t care! This was more
important, and it came first. So, he kept the letters coming.
2 It may help to recall the Soviet territorial hierarchy. The Soviet Union’s basic
constituents were republics – the Russian, Ukrainian, Uzbek, and other Soviet
Socialist Republics. Republics were parcelled up into districts – for example, the
Surkhan Daria district. In turn, districts were made up of regions – for example, the
Denau region. So, USSR  republic  district  region.3
Whistleblowing in the Soviet Union
Soviet citizens had limited ways of confronting corruption, injustice, or other abuses.
In Russia, traditions of public and legal redress were historically weak. Instead, the
subjects of the Empire relied on private petitions to the seat of power; when this
failed, they turned to drink or to insurrection. The Bolshevik leaders cultivated the
tradition of personal appeal to the ruler (Livshin and Orlov 1998; Sokolov 1998;
Livshin, Orlov, and Khlevniuk 2002), for several reasons. They shared a collective
preference for the private petition over outlets for discontent that were more public
or less peaceful. Since they already managed “public opinion” with great care, the
changing tenor of personal petitions also gave them insight into the true underlying
mood of the masses. Privately, also, many leaders exploited the personal appeals
they received, dealing selectively with favoured correspondents to form networks of
patronage and loyalty. As the poet Osip Mandelshtam famously remarked,
“Everyone goes to someone; there’s no other way”; the Mandelshtams, for example,
“went to” Nikolai Bukharin (Nadezhda Mandelshtam 1975, p. 133).
The total volume of such correspondence was huge (Lampert 1985, pp. 63-4).
Over the decade of the 1970s, for example, the central party committee alone
received more than five million letters from citizens. Citizens also wrote to the press.
In 1975 more than 7,000 letters reached the central committee and the three
biggest daily papers in Moscow on an average working day. It follows that nearly all
letters went unanswered. If as many as 130 of the 7,000 received a substantive
reply, then the average letter writer could expect this with a probability similar to
the chance (1.86%) of winning at least the smallest prize (£10) on a single ticket in
the British national lottery. We know that poor people will buy lottery tickets in spite
of adverse odds, and the tradition of writing to authority also persisted through the
life of the Soviet Union.
It was a different matter when abuses were exposed in public. It was not just
that a whistle blown out loud invited the authorities more forcefully to take action;
given close political censorship, the fact that the whistle was blown for all to hear
suggested that officialdom had already heard it. Those subject to exposure could not
ignore it; they had to react.
Table 1. Some Outcomes of Whistleblowing in the Soviet Union, 1979 to 1983
Accused of wrongdoing Complainants
No penalty 16 No adverse consequences 23
Reprimanded 31 Dismissed permanently 9
Transferred to other work 5 Reinstated after dismissal 14
Discharged 16 Dismissed permanently
Fined 3 after reinstatement 3
Tried and convicted 2 Less severe penalty 13
Expelled from party* 7 Left work voluntarily 4
Total 80 Total 66
* Expulsion from the party was sometimes a prelude to prosecution, since it avoided
the disgrace of a party member appearing in open court.
Source: Figures are from Lampert (1985, pp. 141, 155).4
Table 1 sets out what is known about the extent and nature of counteractions to
whistle blowing in the late Brezhnev period. In 70 cases that appeared in the Soviet
national press between 1979 and 1983, Nicholas Lampert tracked the fates of 80
persons accused of wrongdoing and 66 complainants. These cases should not be
taken as fully representative, since they were selected for exposure in the national
media, often after the complainant had failed to find satisfaction locally. It is not
completely surprising, therefore, that four fifths (64) of the 80 accused of wrong
doing were subsequently penalized in some way. Notably, three fifths (39) of the 66
complainants also suffered some kind of victimization. Many were dismissed at
some stage in the dispute, although in some cases the dismissal was subsequently
reversed. Lesser forms of victimization included ostracism, transfer to less preferred
work, reprimands, and the withholding of bonuses.
3
Lampert explained the scope for counteraction against whistleblowers as
follows: First, corrupt or illegal practices tended to have many immediate
beneficiaries. The factory manager who padded production or wage figures would
share the gains with the management team and workforce, who all relied on his
patronage for bonuses and higher wages. Second, the party leaders in the workplace
and locality typically sided with the malefactor for the sake of goodwill and personal
connections, to uphold the reputation of the region for success in implementing the
plan, and so as not to wash dirty linen in public. In general, it was easy for those
whose behavior gave rise to criticism to mobilize opinion against the critics, isolate
them, and present them as troublemakers.
In this light, the story of Mr Nikolaenko’s fight for justice against the party mafia
of the Surkhan Daria valley will turn out to be typical. What is gained by telling it? It
is worth telling for three reasons. One is that it is uncensored. It has not been
selected or crafted for publication to suit some official purpose. There are gaps, but
what is missing reflects the incompleteness of all historical records; the documents
have not been cut about by some prissy official with concealment in mind. Another
reason is the notably large number of people and wide range of agencies that were
eventually drawn into the case. A third is its timing: we catch Soviet society in
transition from mass terror to selective repression, as centre-local relationships are
adjusting to the new realities. In these ways, typical or not, the story of Mr
Nikolaenko provides a drama in the best tradition of social realism, with high
political stakes and a wide cast of characters from many walks of life.
Action and Counteraction
By writing his letters, Nikolaenko annoyed a lot of people. You can imagine them all
telling him to shut up. Why did he have to make a fuss? Those he criticized were the
pillars of the local community. These men knew each other, worked together, and
3 To these cases might be added the voluntary departures. Although few in
number (4), they raise the suspicion of constructive dismissal, or resignation forced
by the employer’s deliberately unreasonable conduct. Lampert’s interview evidence
(1985, pp. 156-157) suggests that this was a common counteraction against critics.5
drank together. They were happy with things as they were, and they were not doing
any particular harm to Mr Nikolaenko. They didn’t want to have to change for the
sake of this grumpy old man with a bee in his bonnet. All they wanted was that he
should be quiet and let them be. But he wasn’t listening. So, they acted.
The result was a scandal that broke quietly, behind closed doors, in Moscow in
the late summer of 1959. It engulfed the farm managers, party leaders, civil police,
secret police, and judiciary of the Denau region and ended with the leaders of the
Uzbek communist party in Tashkent being held to account for their subordinates’
crimes and misdemeanours.
Nikolaenko’s first problem was that, no matter what he complained about,
nothing was done.
Mr Nikolaenko was ignored by those to whom he complained, but those about
whom he complained did not ignore him. This was his second problem. In the
summer of 1957, he complained to the local police about assaults on his children
and damage to his property. The police established the facts, but merely cautioned
the culprits – the local farm managers. In September, section chief Badalov of the
Denau regional party committee shared Nikolaenko’s complaints with the farm
leaders, but then dropped the matter.
The following March the editors of Leninskoe znamia passed one of Nikolaenko’s
letters to Denau regional prosecutor Alimov, who filed the letter and forgot about it.
At about the same time, Nikolaenko’s targets began to escalate their counteraction.
On March 28, 1958, farm chairman Keldyev instructed his deputy Alikulov to send in
the tractors. Without warning, farm workers ploughed up Nikolaenko’s private
allotment, destroyed his orchard and market garden, and blocked access to his own
house. Since the inception of the collective farms, every Soviet farmer had retained
the right to a small private allotment that ensured personal survival when the state
had taken everything else. An orchard and a market garden were all that stood
between many families and penury.
In justification Alikulov claimed that the collective farm needed to put more land
under cotton, and Nikolaenko was holding more than his fair share privately. Both
claims were false. Nikolaenko’s share was less than the others’, and the land
ploughed up remained fallow through 1958. Nikolaenko now had fresh grounds for
complaint. He turned to section chief Badalov of the Denau regional party
committee – the same Badalov that had ignored him the previous autumn.
At this point the affair took a new and shocking turn towards conspiracy.
Badalov (for the party) and Keldyev (the farm boss) brought in the secret police in
the person of the Denau regional KGB commissioner Suleimanov. The three visited
Nikolaenko at home to call him out for a fistfight. The purpose of this was more
sinister than just to inflict physical punishment. It was a provocation; afterwards,
they filed a complaint to the effect that Nikolaenko had threatened to murder
Alikulov in retaliation for ploughing up his land.
During April 1958, the local KGB gathered other compromising documents.
Suleimanov sought out farm workers that had crossed Nikolaenko’s path for any
reason over the years and secured statements from them that Nikolaenko had
threatened to murder them or people they knew. One wrote that Nikolaenko had6
wanted to kill him “roughly, in August 1955”; another said that Nikolaenko had
“fired a rifle at him and others in the spring of 1951.” (Like many men in the Soviet
countryside, Nikolaenko had legal possession of a hunting rifle.) The significance of
this went beyond threatening behavior. Since the December 1934 murder of the
Leningrad party leader Kirov, the secret police had investigated and prosecuted
violence or threats against party and government officials as terrorism. Suleimanov
was building a case against Nikolaenko as part of the Soviet “war on terror”!
On May 20, 1958, the Denau police confiscated Nikolaenko’s rifle and arrested
him. At this point there was a hitch: the police themselves could not see hard
evidence of a crime. Still, they understood what was expected of them: they passed
the case to local prosecutor Alimov – the same one that had ignored Nikolaenko’s
representations just two months earlier. Alimov now indicted Nikolaenko with:
Preparation of the premeditated murder of deputy chairman of the Khrushchev
collective farm, party organizer Alikulov; chairman of the collective farm and
member of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, hero of
socialist labour Keldyev; first secretary of the Denau regional party committee,
hero of socialist labour Khaidarov; director of the Khazarbag state farm, hero of
socialist labour Zibrov; and others.
(Remember all those “heroes of socialist labour.” It’s important later.)
The case now went outside Denau, to the Surkhan Daria regional court. Twice,
the court threw the case out. The judge could see that the witnesses were all
interested parties, and some allegations concerning Nikolaenko’s way of life and
means of support were obviously fabricated. Nikolaenko was not released, however;
the case was returned to Alimov for further investigation.
Foiled in the courts, the conspiracy now took another extraordinary turn. The
prosecutor sent Nikolaenko to Tashkent, the capital city of Uzbekistan. Writing
letters and attacking people like this – he must be crazy! He was detained in a
psychiatric clinic. Silencing trouble makers by diagnosing mental illness was not
without precedent in the Soviet Union, but it was still a decade before the
application of punitive psychiatry to political and cultural “troublemakers” became
routine.
In Tashkent, the psychiatrists examined Nikolaenko. He continued to behave in a
very annoying way, writing “dozens” of complaints about his unjust imprisonment.
But he was not crazy. The psychiatrists put professional ethics before the interests of
the Denau regional clan. On December 22, 1958, Nikolaenko was released for lack of
reason to detain him.
But there was no triumphant return. During his detention the Nikolaenko family
was deprived of his pension; his daughter lost her job on the farm. While Mrs
Nikolaenko was away visiting her husband, “unknown persons” visited their home
and burned the storehouse, destroying possessions and grain. Subsequently farm
chairman Keldyev ordered the house demolished on the (spurious) grounds that it
was built on a site previously occupied by the farm’s mill, and was also obstructing
the cotton crop.7
After these events Mrs Nikolaenko threw herself on Keldyev’s mercy and asked
for his protection. He gave her no succour. One night in November farmworker
Karaev, accompanied by a gang armed with knives, visited the family to demand the
Nikolaenko daughter in marriage. This was the last straw. The family fled the
neighbourhood, resettling near Tashkent. Mr Nikolaenko no longer had a home to
return to in the valley of the Surkhan Daria River.
For one guilty pair, retribution was speedy. In March 1959 the prosecutor of the
Uzbek republic fired Denau prosecutor Alimov because of his malicious prosecution
of Nikolaenko, and disciplined a local investigator. For the time being, the buck
stopped there.
Moscow’s Intervention and More Shocking Disclosures
With Nikolaenko free once more, the remaining parties to the conspiracy agreed on
the only possible course of action available to them: pretend nothing had happened.
Forced to accept the illegality of Nikolaenko’s arrest, they turned their efforts to
protecting each other and avoiding accountability. When Nikolaenko asked the
prosecutors for compensation from the Khrushchev collective farm, they told him he
would have to bring a private action. He sued them for 5,350 rubles – half a year’s
salary for a waged farmworker. Denying liability, the farm paid him 3,000 rubles out
of court. When Surkhan Daria district prosecutor Faizylov asked the Denau regional
party committee to hold the farm deputy chairman Alikulov to account for his
actions, first secretary Khaidarov consigned the letter to the archive. But when the
Uzbekistan republican prosecutor ordered Faizylov to hold a special inspection of
the Khrushchev farm, Faizylov refused on the grounds that a routine inspection had
recently taken place.
At this point everybody knew what had happened. The party organizations, the
prosecution service, the local police and KGB had all colluded in it. Complicity
extended up to the level of the Surkhan Daria district party committee, which
delayed action until an investigator showed up from Moscow, 2,000 miles away; the
day he arrived, it resolved at last to condemn Mr Nikolaenko’s illegal detention –
and asserted in the next breath that his claims of persecution by any specific person
were unfounded.
Moscow’s man was Instructor Fedorenko of the Committee of Party Control.
This committee, to which Mr Nikolaenko had appealed as a last resort, was the
Soviet leadership’s watchdog on the party, charged with investigating wrong doing
and negligence by individual party members (Getty 1997; Markevich 2007).
Instructor Fedorenko reviewed the papers and interviewed the principals. It was like
pulling at a loose thread: quickly, the fabric of local power in the Denau region
unravelled.
Having established the facts of his ordeal, Fedorenko turned to Mr Nikolaenko’s
initial complaints, about which the local authorities were still in denial. Nikolaenko
had objected, for example, to the Khrushchev farm being run without the services of
a professional agricultural technician. The technician, who had criticized the farm
managers in party meetings, was fired while away at an agricultural show. His case
of unfair dismissal rose to the level of the Uzbek republican party central committee8
which, ordering his reinstatement, reported this to Moscow as the outcome.
Fedorenko discovered that the true outcome was the opposite of the report: the
technician had not been taken back, and had been forced out of the district.
Again: the farm had passed more land and livestock than the law permitted into
the private ownership of farm members. Having complained to the regional party
committee that Keldyev was selling livestock to friends and relatives, a farmworker
had been disciplined for “slander.” Fedorenko established easily that the accusation
was true.
When Fedorenko delved into the facts, he found that the abuses that
Nikolaenko had sought to expose were the tip of an iceberg. As his spotlight
widened from the original allegations to the cover-up on the Denau regional party
committee, Fedorenko found more and more suppressed complaints. For example,
he identified several other whistleblowers that had tried to expose faults and abuses
on the Khrushchev farm and elsewhere, who had been silenced, disciplined,
removed from their jobs, or excluded from farm membership.
He reported other striking incidents, several featuring regional party committee
secretary Khaidarov. Remember the “heroes of socialist labour” that Nikolaenko was
supposed to have planned to murder? In 1956 and 1957, Fedorenko found,
Khaidarov had conspired with other local party leaders and farm managers to
underreport the regional acreage under cotton. In both years they “lost” more than
ten thousand acres. By reporting less land under cotton they were able to raise the
reported yield of cotton per acre, and so exceed the centre’s target for the cotton
yield. As a reward, they and their colleagues received a state decoration: “hero of
socialist labour.” How they had done it was not exactly a secret. Anonymous
complaints had reached Moscow. Moscow passed them back to the district
committee for investigation. The district committee passed them down to the
regional committee, and the regional committee filed them away.
Khaidarov’s personal life spilled over into his party activities – or was it the other
way around? He had started a sexual relationship with party worker Miss
Kobliakova, and had helped her financially. He was already blessed with a large
family and his wife took exception. Mrs Khaidarova protested loudly to both the
regional and district committees. Khaidarov assured everyone that the affair was
over. Miss Kobliakova left the district, and no more was said about it (or her).
Khaidarov also built himself a large private residence near the Khrushchev farm
with timber supplied by chairman Keldyev from the farm. Underlying this was a
complex exchange of favours. Khaidarov reportedly paid for the timber with cash.
The construction was done by workers from another farm, the neighbouring Stalin
agricultural cooperative, where Khaidarov’s brother was a member. Supposedly the
work done on the house paid off the work done by Khaidarov’s brother on the Stalin
farm. Meanwhile Khaidarov’s brother built his own house – and then left the
cooperative.
Fedorenko found that private residential construction was booming in the
Denau region. The boom reflected supply and demand. On the demand side, several
local farm managers and party functionaries seemed to have money to spend
beyond their official means, and were putting the money into housebuilding. On the9
supply side, the labour and timber for housebuilding were being taken out of local
farms.
What did it all mean? It is easy to see what drove demand. The Soviet economy
provided few legal instruments for personal saving: cash, saving bank accounts
paying low interest, and government bonds that not only paid low interest but were
non-transferable and redeemable only after relatively long terms. Neither cash nor
bank accounts were secure; in living memory the government had compulsorily
converted both on unfavourable terms. Other instruments that were secure, such as
foreign currency and precious metals and stones, were not legal. How could a family
with surplus income diversify its assets securely? Building a private home in a rural
neighbourhood was one of the few options.
From Moscow’s point of view, this undermined the plan for national economic
development. Personal saving, if held in cash or at the bank, could be matched by
public investments in the economic and military infrastructure. Directly or indirectly,
these investments drew on the food and materials produced by the country’s farms.
But if householders invested their own savings in private homes, and if the building
of these homes diverted farm resources from supplying the state with resources for
public investment, the private investment was competing resources away from the
state plan for public investment and so actively undermining the Soviet economy.
Fedorenko found that the Uzbek republican party central committee knew all
about the private housing boom in the Denau district. In Tashkent they told him that
the Surkhan Daria district committee had the matter in hand. The persons
responsible were now willing to transfer their homes to the social housing stock in
return for compensation at the state’s valuation. To pay for this, the district housing
authority was currently seeking a “large” additional grant from Moscow’s budget. (If
allowed, this would eventually have to be paid for out of higher taxes or cutbacks in
public spending somewhere else.)
Fedorenko’s fact-finding also suggests how precious private residences were to
the owners, with how much energy they were defended, and how those with
connections could defend them. A petrol tanker driver accidentally damaged the
home of a farm bookkeeper. Instead of pursuing the legal remedies available, the
farm chairman held the tanker hostage, siphoning off fuel and removing the tires,
until the driver had personally compensated the home owner.
One last petty abuse. Close by the Denau station one day, railway worker Aliev
detained secretary for propaganda Umarov of the Surkhan Daria district party
committee for trying to drive over the track at an unauthorized crossing. Umarov
provoked Aliev into a bitter argument, during which the latter let slip an
“uncensored expression.” So Umarov had Aliev arrested for “petty hooliganism” (i.e.
swearing at a party official) and imprisoned for ten days with loss of pay. Aliev’s
legitimate complaint rose to the Uzbek republican party central committee. Umarov
gave an assurance that he had apologized to Aliev. But not so; Fedorenko found
that, far from apologizing, Umarov had sought Aliev out, shouted at him, demanded
a meeting of the workers to investigate the latter’s misdemeanour, and was
restrained from starting the scandal up all over again only by others present.10
Outcomes and Explanations
Fedorenko concluded with a recommendation: the next step should be to summon
farm chairman Keldyev, secretary Khaidarov of the regional party committee, first
secretary Khakimov of the district party committee, and representatives of the
republican party and prosecution service to meet the Committee for Party Control.
To judge from the record, this meeting took place in the late summer of 1959. As a
direct result the Uzbek republican party central committee took steps to “correct
the indicated faults and punish the guilty.” We do not know what that meant; the
only concrete measure of punishment in the record is that district committee
secretary Umarov was reprimanded and demoted to work at a lower level as a
regional party committee secretary.
Mr Nikolaenko’s moral victory over the party mafia of the Surkhan Daria district
raises a fascinating question. What enabled this ordinary, undistinguished pensioner
to triumph over the local power elite? Why did Moscow listen to him, when the local
authorities were not only deaf to his complaints but conspired to break him? At this
time, even after Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union remained a harsh, centralized
dictatorship with a censored press; the citizen’s voice had no right to be heard
against the decisions of the party and state. Between 1917 and 1991, millions of
Nikolaenkos were silenced and trampled underfoot without a second thought. As
long as the vital interests of the Soviet state were not damaged, nobody in power
gave a damn about an individual miscarriage of justice. What made Mr Nikolaenko
different?
The answer lay partly in timing; we’ll come back to that. The fundamental thing
was this: from Moscow’s standpoint, the enemies of Mr Nikolaenko were the
enemies of the state! If the state was to defend itself, it had to defend Mr
Nikolaenko.
Think about Stalin, a brutal and bloody tyrant but a very smart one. Stalin had
clear goals for the country that he ruled. At least four times in the quarter century
that he ruled, Stalin set about mobilizing the resources of the entire country into
huge efforts: in the early 1930s, to industrialize the country and organize the
peasants into collective farms that would supply the country’s new towns and
factories with bread, meat, and milk; in the late 1930s, to arm the country against
German plans to colonize the East; in the early 1940s, to fight off Hitler’s devastating
surprise attack and conquer Germany; in the late 1940s, to build a country ruined
and decimated by invasion and war into an atomic power.
At every stage, Stalin faced resistance. He understood its sources and learned to
anticipate it. An obvious source was the enemies he could see: the leaders abroad
and at home who could turn against him. More challenging was resistance by the
enemy he could not see: the ordinary citizens. These were the millions who, as they
went about their daily lives, worked consciously or unconsciously to frustrate the
dictator’s plans. They did this by doing what came naturally. When Moscow spoke,
they nodded, then watched and waited to see how things turned out. They were
slow to respond and avoided responsibility. At meetings they cheered socialism and
saluted the banner of Lenin and Stalin – often sincerely. Afterwards they went home11
to build their own homes and futures and those of their friends and relatives. Above
all, they helped each other appear to the outside as if they were utterly loyal
servants of the proletariat and heroes of socialist labour, and this was not so hard
because they did not necessarily disbelieve. But at heart they were just doing their
best to protect themselves and their families.
All this came naturally. They were still doing it naturally when they became
pillars of the community and joined the party, got appointed to the farm
management, and were selected for the regional and district party committees. For
them, politics was a continuation of everyday life by other means.
This strategy worked better in some places than in others. The places where it
worked best of all were a long way from Moscow. Such places tended to have stable
populations – most people would know each other and each other’s background,
and many would be related by blood or marriage. Most people knew whom they
could trust; even if they didn’t completely trust each other’s good will, they often
knew about their neighbours’ peccadilloes and secrets to the extent that they could
still rely on cooperation. Perhaps it worked still better where a dominant non-
Russian ethnicity clearly marked insiders from outsiders. In fact, the remote valley of
the Surkhan Daria probably had just about the best conditions imaginable for a local
clan to work up some protection against the guys from Moscow.
To the extent that they succeeded in quietly going about their everyday business
in this way, such little people could win a modest degree of security and private
prosperity to which they had no legal right. As a result, in common with their
neighbours, they had a lot to lose. Anyone who threatened to spoil things could
become a problem for the whole community – a troublemaker, like Mr Nikolaenko.
The main task that Keldyev and Khaidarov faced in dealing with their
troublesome neighbour was to confine the matter to the Denau region, where they
knew everyone and could limit the consequences. If only the repercussions could
have been contained within the territory of the local power structure, they would
have got away with it. The stratagem they chose, however, relied on a few key
people outside the Denau region to collude with them. Some were willing, for
example the district party committee and district prosecution service. Fatally, some
were not. If only the district court had not tossed out the evidence against him for
planning terrorist acts, if only the republican psychiatric service had gone along with
declaring him crazy, we would never have heard of Mr Nikolaenko.
Now think about this from the perspective of Moscow in the mid-1950s. Stalin
was dead. But Stalin’s problem had not gone away. His successors had the same
problem of ensuring Moscow’s supremacy over local communities and clans the
length and breadth of that vast country, a sixth of the world’s land surface, 6,000
miles from end to end. In fact, their problem was now worse than before, because
they had voluntarily thrown away Stalin’s chief instrument: mass terror. Their new
regime was fragile – they must have wondered, what if mass terror had been the
only thing that was making all those millions of party members in the faraway
republics, districts and regions fall in line? The Kremlin’s new tenants had closed
down the Gulag and purged the secret police, replacing the old ministry of state12
security with a new government committee under “party control”: the KGB. Would
this be enough to hold the country together?
For Moscow, pensioner Nikolaenko was a godsend. Unexpectedly, he gave the
centre a direct line of microscopic vision into the inner working arrangements of a
local power elite. That vision was alarming and comforting at the same time.
Alarming, because they could suddenly see with their own eyes how a little mafia
was at work – the self-protection club of the Surkhan Daria valley.
The scale and multiplicity of local corruption would have set alarm bells ringing
in the Kremlin, but loudest may have been the bell rung by the collusion of the local
KGB. This was a society without free expression or public opinion, in which everyone
tried to look loyal, whatever they were actually doing or trying to do. Given that,
how was Moscow to uncover disloyalty? Everywhere, under and after Stalin, before
and above all, the secret police was the Kremlin’s eyes and ears in the farm and
factory, in the village hall and community centre, and on the streets. The KBG’s
loyalty to Moscow was a fundamental assumption.
Under Stalin, loyalty to Moscow meant personal loyalty to the tyrant that Stalin
became. Stalin used the secret police any way he liked, and that included policing
the “ruling” party. In moving the Soviet political system away from Stalinism,
Khrushchev took a calculated risk. He brought the secret police under “party
control.” The party would control the KGB, not the other way around. But who was
the party? The party had millions of members and was organized in every
establishment and locality of Soviet society. The party in Moscow was not the same
as the party in the Denau region. “Party control” created scope to divide the
loyalties of the secret policemen. In the Nikolaenko affair a KGB officer had gone
native; he had thrown in his lot with a local clan, with the Keldyevs and Khaidarovs.
If that pattern became widespread it was bad news for Moscow.
The comforting news for Moscow was that Mr Nikolaenko was not alone. Not
everyone in this story was a crook or a timeserver. There were many Mr Nikolaenkos
that had been trying to speak the truth to Moscow. These were special people; each
and every one of them needed Moscow’s attention and support.
A Speculation
Mr Nikolaenko was a special person. His persistence certainly exceeded the normal
range. Another special characteristic was surely his preference for Moscow’s
objectives and Moscow’s rules over those of his neighbours. How do we know that?
Not directly; but we can guess.
Mr Nikolaenko was not, apparently, a party member. If he was, Fedorenko’s
report would surely have said so. Besides, as we have seen, party membership did
not guarantee alignment with Moscow’s goals. But Nikolaenko had fought in the civil
war – presumably, with the Bolsheviks. Moreover, this was not the last conflict in
which he had sided with Moscow.
Buried in Nikolaenko’s original complaints against Khrushchev farm deputy
chairman Alikulov is a reference to the latter’s family origins: in the 1930s Alikulov’s
parents had been victims of Stalin’s repression of those peasants considered to be
unduly wealthy – the “kulaks.” Fedorenko confirms this, adding: “Whether13
Nikolaenko, as he writes, took part in the dekulakization of [Alikulov’s] family cannot
be established.” But it seems that Nikolaenko was trying to explain his persecution
partly on the basis that Alikulov was resurrecting a vendetta against one of Stalin’s
loyal agents that originated in the 1930s.
Consider the ethnicity of names like Alikulov, Alimov, Faisulov, Karaev, Keldyev,
Khaidarov, Khakimov, and Suleimanov. Alikulov was from an Uzbek family.
Nikolaenko’s family origin, on the other hand, lay in the far distant Ukraine. How did
a Ukrainian come to be involved in the dispossession of an Uzbek family in the early
1930s? Here’s a possibility; let’s call it an educated guess.
In November 1929, Stalin’s Politburo launched a campaign to send 25,000 urban
workers to the countryside to force the pace of farm collectivization. The total
number of party activists mobilized from the cities for the war against the peasantry
eventually reached a hundred thousand. Their story has been told by Lynne Viola.
No one volunteered for this battle that was not motivated by an idealistic
commitment to the general party line. In the countryside, their ideals were tested.
Many suffered conditions of dreadful isolation and extreme deprivation. Many fell
out of the ranks; some lost their health, others their ideals, and more than a few lost
their lives. Those left when the battle was over were hardened in their convictions,
unable “to merge with their local surroundings, to cast off their proletarian identity”
(Viola 1987, pp. 185, 192).
A minority of the 25,000ers settled permanently in the countryside to work,
uphold the new villages, and raise their families there. Maybe, the young Nikolaenko
was one of these. He would have arrived in the Surkhan Daria valley around 1930, an
outsider sent by Moscow to enforce the general line of the party and impose a
violent “revolution from above” on the countryside. If so, a quarter century later he
was still there.
If this is truly what happened, it would explain for sure why Mr Nikolaenko
never quite bonded with his Uzbek neighbours. The old man just wouldn’t let
himself be drawn into their little local games or endorse their petty ambitions; or
perhaps they wouldn’t let him in. By the 1950s the neighbours all looked like loyal
citizens, stalwarts of collective farming, and pillars of the party. But only one
generation had passed since the confiscations and deportations of Stalin’s “great
breakthrough.” Nikolaenko remembered it, and they remembered Nikolaenko.
Perhaps the past wasn’t over yet. Nikolaenko was getting on in years. The children
of Stalin’s victims were getting on with their own lives, but evidently they did not
feel much need to play fair with him if he was still making trouble for them.
In Conclusion
Instructor Fedorenko has left us an historical epic of everyday life in the middle of
the twentieth century in a faraway valley of Soviet Uzbekistan. In the background, a
far-flung dictatorship and its vast bureaucracy struggle to turn from mass terror to
controlled repression. In the foreground a quarrelsome old man carries on a bitter
feud with his neighbours; although badly battered, he emerges vindicated.
In those complex times the protagonists dressed up in complex identities. The
old man cast himself to carry the sword of truth and the shield of justice against a14
self-interested mafia that had corrupted the legality of the proletarian state. The
network that opposed him was made up of ordinary people, not master criminals.
Scarred by their own history, often rough and ill-mannered, they had no interest in
trust or mutual aid as fundamental moral values, only as means of survival. By
cooperation they aimed to hollow out a niche for themselves and their families, to
defend their homes, to hold up a roof against brutal, distant outsiders, and to close
the curtains against an intrusive, confrontational neighbor. Surely they would have
echoed the words of Lampert’s invented character (1985: p. 183):
What principle do the “truth seekers” represent? They represent a world of
thorough and cold-blooded state control. The whistleblowers are the
totalitarians of the piece, spying on their colleagues and fellow workers and
setting themselves up as agents for the prying eyes of the state.
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